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"I take judge-made law as one of the realities of life."
-Benjamin Cardozo'
In 1966, Justice Mathew Tobriner wrote the opinion in the celebrated
Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. case.2 Justice Tobriner was by that time a recog-
nized and influential jurist of national repute. Known throughout his tenure as
a judicial activist, Justice Tobriner believed that legal decisions should adapt to
changing attitudes and mores of a modem society.3 Justice Tobriner's legal
opinions were therefore consistently designed to reflect current community
principles and to protect the freedom of individuals within that community.4
In order to protect those individual rights within a society increasingly
infused with imbalance of power, Justice Tobriner was a leader in revitalizing
the early common law concept of imposing extra-contractual obligations based
on the status or relationship of a quasi-public organization to a weaker party.5
Justice Tobriner considered traditional contract law inadequate to protect indi-
viduals entering into agreements with large organizations and so believed extra-
contractual impositions were required to maintain balance of bargaining
power.
6
In the area of tort law, Justice Tobriner also enlarged the concept of duty,
with emphasis on the status of each of the parties and their relationship to each
other.7 With this expanded concept of duty for parties in a special relationship,
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Justice Tobriner encouraged greater sensitivity toward plaintiffs' injuries and
protection of their rights.'
His opinions in cases involving real property also supported his values of
economic fairness and promoted protection of consumers' reasonable expecta-
tions.9 Justice Tobriner's application of these values in his decisions reflect his
awareness of the socioeconomic realities of contemporary society and his belief
in the need for judicial action to remedy inequity.'
The Gray case attracted attention immediately due to its far-reaching
effects and Justice Tobriner's reputation." Over time it has proven to be a
standard by which other cases are measured.' 2 In the pages that follow, I make
the case that Gray's importance and lasting power is attributable to several
factors. These include its simple, easily absorbed facts, and its influence on
three important aspects of modem insurance law: the intentional acts exclusion
with the related insurer's conflict of interest, the doctrine of reasonable expec-
tations, and the duty to defend. While the facts were beyond Justice Tobriner's
control, the eloquence of Gray's rhetoric was not and in it he displays the sure
work of a seasoned jurist at the height of his abilities. My judgment is that the
facts and the confluence of issues discussed in Gray argue easily for its
immortality.
I. THE FACTS
The facts of Gray v. Zurich are tailored to the classroom. They are sim-
ple, easily accessible, and provide a sound basis for empathy. Dr. Gray was
involved in a near-miss automobile collision. The driver of the other car, John
Jones, approached Gray and jerked open Gray's car door in a menacing way.
Gray, using a preemptive strike theory of self-defense, struck Jones who sued
for the intentional tort. Jones asked for $50,000 in actual damages and $50,000
in punitive damages. Gray tendered the claim and defense to Zurich. Zurich
refused to defend and, at trial, Jones recovered $6,000 in actual damages.
The insuring agreement, which is spelled out in the second full paragraph
of the opinion, provides a good introduction to the case and to the intricacies of
insurance law. The court notes:
8 Id.
9 Jonathan R. Adler & Richard M. Mosk, Justice Tobriner and Real Property, 29 HASTINGS
L.J. 127, 128 (1977).
10 Id. at 129.
"l William E. Knepper, Insurer's Duty to Defend: Recent Developments, 17 DEFENSE L.J.
391 (1968); Donald F. Farbstein & Francis J. Stillman, Insurance for the Commission of
Intentional Torts, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 1219 (1969); Note, The Insurer's Duty to Defend Made
Absolute: Gray v. Zurich, 14 UCLA L. REV. 1328 (1967).
12 Paula L. Harrington, The Duty to Defend in California After Montrose Chemical Corpo-
ration v. Superior Court: Is the California Supreme Court Protecting Policyholders or
Encouraging Litigation and the Early Settlement of Unworthy Claims?, 31 CAL. W. L. REV.
165, 170 (1994) (noting the importance of Gray v. Zurich).
Bob Schiff, whom I acknowledge above, has often told me that he believes he could
teach a semester-long insurance law course using only Gray v. Zurich. While I think I agree,
as a teacher of insurance law, I have been reluctant to take on his tacit challenge. In the
interest of full disclosure, as a casebook author I confess a pecuniary interest in not having
Gray be the sole case in my book.
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[Gray], is the named insured under an insurance policy issued by [Zurich]. A "Com-
prehensive Personal Liability Endorsement" in the policy states, under a paragraph
designated "Coverage L," that the insurer agrees "[T]o pay on behalf of the insured
all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because
of bodily injury or property damage, and the company shall defend any suit against
the insured alleging such bodily injury or property damage and seeking damages
which are payable under the terms of this endorsement, even if any of the allegations
are groundless, false or fraudulent; but the company may make such investigation
and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient." The policy contains a
provision that "[T]his endorsement does not apply" to a series of specified exclusions
set forth under separate headings, including a paragraph (c) which reads, "under cov-
erages L and M, to bodily injury or property damages caused intentionally by or at
the direction of the insured."'
13
This neatly captures the essence of the dispute. While Gray is ostensibly
covered for any bodily injury he might cause, the coverage does not extend to
bodily injury that is intentionally caused. At first glance, Zurich appears to be
correct in its assessment. Indeed, the language might lead a layperson to
believe that she would not receive any protection for her intentional acts. Thus,
the stage is set for a classic drama. All appears lost for the hapless Dr. Gray.
II. THE INTENTIONAL ACTS EXCLUSION
California Insurance Code Section 533 states "[a]n insurer is not liable for
a loss caused by the willful act of the insured; but he is not exonerated by the
negligence of the insured, or of the insured's agent or others."14 The statute is
based on the fundamental public policy that "[t]o allow recovery for such losses
would encourage conduct which is socially undesirable because it is injurious
to others . .. or simply economically wasteful."' 5 On that basis, courts have
held that an insurer cannot agree to cover acts excluded by the statute.16 Thus,
Dr. Gray's initial hurdle is that Section 533 of the California Insurance Code
bars coverage for intentional injury. 17 Zurich's position was that to provide a
defense in these circumstances would violate the public policy of not covering
intentional acts.' 8
13 Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 170 (Cal. 1966).
14 A "willful act" within the meaning of this section means something more than ordinary
negligence or the mere intentional doing of an act; the existence of an intent to injure is
relevant. Nuffer v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 45 Cal. Rptr. 918, 925 (Ct. App. 1965).
15 James M. Fischer, The Exclusion From Insurance Coverage of Losses Caused by the
Intentional Acts of the Insured: A Policy in Search of Justification, 30 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 95 (1990).
16 Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 815, 830-31 (1993).
17 Gary L. Fontana & Anthony J. Barron, Insurance Coverage for Intentional Acts, 658 PLI
Comm. 203 (1993) (providing an overview of insurance coverage for willful acts including
the public policy rationale, the difficulty in determining the willfulness of the insured's con-
duct, and the conflicting jurisdictional approaches).
Dr. Gray's problem was a matter of contract. Gray, 419 P.2d at 177. Professor Robert
H. Jerry observes that "after the mid-1960s it became common to find liability policies stat-
ing that coverage would not exist for [acts] intended from the standpoint of the insured."
ROBERT H. JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW? 63C (2d ed. 1996).
18 Gray, 419 P.2d at 177.
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The intentional acts exclusion makes sense. With the exclusion memorial-
ized in a statute, in the contract, and in the case law, Dr. Gray's position
seemed bleak. However, in the time leading up to Gray v. Zurich, California
case law had laid a small foundation that, in at least two instances, the courts
had avoided the exclusion.19 In 1955, Arenson v. National Auto & Casualty
Insurance Co. held that the exclusion did "not preclude an insured who has not
participated in an intentional injury from being indemnified against liability for
an injury intentionally caused by another insured."" ° In another opinion by
Justice Tobriner, Tomerlin v. Canadian Indemnity, the California Supreme
Court held that:
[a]lthough an insurer may not indemnify against liability caused by the insured's
willful wrong, defendant's liability here does not arise from a contract executed prior
to plaintiffs willful misconduct, but from an estoppel which arose after it....
Recovery under a subsequent estoppel does not offend such public policy [discourag-
ing intentional acts]. "It [does] not tend to encourage unlawful conduct. It [does] not
arouse an illegal temptation."
2 1
Gray v. Zurich was not so limited or timid in approach. The court noted
that an insurance policy imposes dual obligations on an insurer. The first is a
duty to indemnify against loss; the second is a duty to defend.2 2 Justice Tobri-
ner's innovation was to limit the public policy prohibition to indemnity only,
reasoning that otherwise, the basic purpose of insurance, to provide litigation
protection, is defeated.2 3 As a second rationale, Justice Tobriner observed that
providing a defense does not hamper the policy of not encouraging intentional
acts.2 4
In what is the only weak aspect of the case, Gray v. Zurich glosses over
the conflict of interest problem that arises. Obviously, the insurer has a vested
19 Donald F. Farbstein & Francis J. Stillman, Insurance for the Commission of Intentional
Torts, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 1219, 1222 (1969) ("Coverage for the intentional wrong of an agent
was the earliest form of insurance for intentional tort liability to receive judicial
recognition.").
20 Arenson v. Nat'l Auto. & Cas. Ins., 286 P.2d 816, 818 (Cal. 1955).
21 394 P.2d 571, 577-78 (Cal. 1964) (quoting New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d
191, 195) (6th Cir. 1943)) (emphasis added).
22 Gray, 419 P.2d at 173.
23 Id. at 177-78.
24 Id.; see also Bodell v. Walbrook Ins. Co., 119 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 1977) (relying on Gray
to allow the defense of a federal criminal prosecution). Professor Willy E. Rice asserts that
courts often allow their biases toward certain classes of victims influence their judgments,
and that too many victims go uncompensated for their injuries because courts declare the
insurer has no duty to defend. Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord Over
Whether Liability Insurers Must Defend Insureds' Allegedly Intentional and Immoral Con-
duct: A Historical and Empirical Review of Federal and State Courts' Declaratory Judg-
ments-1900-1997, 47 AM. U. L. REv. 1131, 1217 (1998). He proposes legislation that
requires insurers to defend policyholders even when a third party complaint alleges an inten-
tional act. Id. at 1218.
By contrast, Professor Susan Randall contends that the traditional complaint rule, by
which the allegations of a third party's complaint determine an insurer's duty to defend an
insured, poses serious problems of increased litigation, costs, and conflicts of interest of the
insurer. Susan Randall, Redefining The Insurer's Duty to Defend, 3 CONN. INS. L.J. 221,
222-23 (1997). Professor Randall suggests that insurers should be permitted to deny defense
to insureds when extrinsic facts indicate no obligation of coverage. Id. at 224.
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interest in pursuing an intentional act theory so as to defeat coverage. In under-
taking the defense of an insured, the insurer might advertently or inadvertently
shape its case so that its duty to indemnify is obviated by the intentional acts
exclusion. While the court seems to give this theory short shrift, the reality is
that the conflict is very real.15
Despite the minor flaw, Justice Tobriner deftly removed a significant bar-
rier to Dr. Gray's claim. Still, without more, the door to Dr. Gray's recovery
was not completely open. In a significant expansion of existing case law, Jus-
tice Tobriner opens up the entire universe of insurance policy interpretation. A
brief background is useful in order to fully appreciate his craftsmanship.
III. THE DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
In the late 1950s, the interpretation of insurance policies in California fol-
lowed a conventional approach, which centered around the principle of contra
proferentem - contracts should be interpreted against the drafter and the uncer-
tainty attendant to the use of imprecise language was to be held against the
drafter.26 That simple approach was soon to be substantially altered.
In 1962, Justice Tobriner wrote the majority opinion in Steven v. Fidelity
& Casualty Co.27 Steven held that an exclusionary clause in an insurance con-
tract would not be enforced where "the public may reasonably expect coverage,
[unless the exclusion was] conspicuous, plain and clear." 28
At the time the Steven opinion was issued, its reach was uncertain. The
case dealt with an airline passenger who had purchased a life insurance policy
from a machine located in an airport.29 When the aircraft in which the insured
passenger was flying crashed, the insurer attempted to avoid payment to the
policy's beneficiaries on the basis of an exclusion that purported to exclude
flights on "unscheduled carriers."3 ° While the decision could have rested on
the ambiguous and arcane nature of the exclusion alone, Justice Tobriner went
beyond the bounds of the traditional contra proferentem principle. According
to one commentator, "the emphasis throughout the [Steven] opinion upon the
reasonable expectations of the weaker party . . . suggests that some sort of
larger principle is at work."3 1
Steven was revolutionary in its own right.3 2 Still, unsurprisingly, it did
not attract significant attention. Machine sold insurance policies were a narrow
25 See, e.g., San Diego Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc., 208 Cal. Rptr. 494
(1984) (requiring the appointment of independent counsel in the case of conflicts); CAL. CIv.
CODE § 2860 (2001) (outlining parameters of the appointment of independent counsel).
26 Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 296 P.2d 801, 809 (Cal. 1956).
27 377 P.2d 284, 294 (Cal. 1962).
28 Id. (emphasis added).
29 Id. at 286.
30 Id. at 290.
31 Martin Kamarck, Opening the Gate: The Steven Case and the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations, 29 HASTINGs L.J. 153, 161 (1977).
32 Rose Elizabeth Bird, Justice Mathew 0. Tobriner - The Heart of a Lion, the Soul of a
Dove, 70 CAL. L. REV. 871 (1982) (listing Steven as an example of Justice Tobriner's
achievements); David M. Balabanian, Justice Was More Than His Title, 70 CAL. L. REV.
878, 879 (1982) (calling the decision "near scandalous" in its time).
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niche of the insurance industry, aircraft crashes were relatively rare, and the
facts (the insured's inability to read the policy before it was deposited in the
mail) suggested that Steven would be relegated to the arcana of insurance law.
Gray v. Zurich changed this view.
Here, Gray v. Zurich is straightforward, covering the basic principles.
First, the insurance contract is one of adhesion and exclusions are interpreted
narrowly. Second, Justice Tobriner, relying on his earlier opinion in Steven,
stated that the doctrine of "reasonable expectations" makes the inconspicuous,
unclear provision hard to enforce.33 While the application of the reasonable
expectations doctrine in Gray v. Zurich flowed naturally from Steven, the
stakes had changed. The doctrine now applied in a wide area and the scope of
the doctrine had been expanded far beyond the narrow facts of Steven. 3
Dr. Gray's dilemma was that the face of Jones' complaint did not bring
Gray's claim within the scope of coverage because of the intentional acts exclu-
sion. After having established that the intentional acts exclusion did not neces-
sarily bar coverage, Justice Tobriner's differentiations of the insurer's dual
duties to indemnify and to defend were key.
First, Justice Tobriner noted that because the result of any case was diffi-
cult to predict, the promise to defend subject to any exclusion was inherently
ambiguous. 35 He stated:
13 According to Steven an exclusionary clause in an insurance policy is not enforceable
where "the public may reasonably expect coverage, [unless that clause is] conspicuous, plain
and clear." Steven, 377 P.2d at 294.
Professor Robert H. Jerry explores the development of the doctrine of reasonable
expectations within insurance law, beginning with Judge Keeton's 1970 Harvard Law
Review article, which identified the principle that reasonable expectations of insureds should
be recognized. Robert H. Jerry, Insurance, Contract, and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expec-
tations, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 21, 22-23 (1998). The doctrine of reasonable expectations protects
the weaker party in a contract transaction by charging insurers with a duty to honor the
insured's reasonable expectations. Professor Jerry concludes that the doctrine should apply
not only to insurance law, but to contract law principles in general. Id. at 55-57.
34 Fischer, supra note 15, at 105.
35 Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 173 (Cal. 1966). One commentator provides a
gloss on this area by describing Florida's experience.
In Florida, the insurer's duties are not coextensive. The duty to defend is generally considered to
be both broader and more difficult to determine than the duty to indemnify. The traditional
explanation for this difference has been timing. Whereas the duty to indemnify is determined
after the facts have been established, the duty to defend is determined at the commencement of
the lawsuit, before the facts have been established.
Gregor J. Schwinghammer, Jr., Insurance Litgation in Florida: Declaratory Judgments and
the Duty to Defend, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 945, 948 (1996).
Florida purports to follow the "exclusive pleading" test, whereby an insurer's duty to defend
arises from the allegations in the complaint. Under Florida law, the duty to defend is "distinct
from and broader than" the duty to indemnify. If a complaint alleges some claims, which are
within coverage, and some claims outside of coverage, the question of defense must be resolved
in favor of the insured, and the insurer must provide a defense for the entire action.
Id. at 950.
Many courts have allowed a declaration regarding the duty to defend, but have required that a
declaration regarding the duty to indemnify must wait until the parties determine liability.... If
the trial court determines that [the insurer] has no duty to defend, the issues of whether [the
insurer] has a duty to indemnify [the insured] will be moot. On the other hand, if [the insurer]
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No one can determine whether the third party suit does or does not fall within the
indemnification coverage of the policy until that suit is resolved .... [Thus, t]he
carrier's obligation to indemnify inevitably will not be defined until the adjudication
of the very action which it should have defended. Hence the policy contains its own
seeds of uncertainty; the insurer has held out a promise that by its very nature is
ambiguous.
36
While the policy could have clarified the point, it did not do so. Moreo-
ver, Justice Tobriner observed that the policy contains a promise to defend even
baseless suits.37 Thus, the insured could have reasonably believed the insurer
would defend the case.
Justice Tobriner bolstered the argument by pointing out that even if Dr.
Gray intended harm, his intention may have caused unintended harm.3 8 Justice
Tobriner summed up by saying "[t]he insured is unhappily surrounded by con-
centric circles of uncertainty. '39 Accordingly, the insurer must defend if the
potential for coverage exists under the policy.'
While Zurich conceded the general rule that a wrongful failure to defend
results in liability for the judgment, it argued the judgment was based on a
matter not within coverage. The response to Zurich's argument was curt.
According to the court, if this were the rule the insured would face an impossi-
ble burden of proving the extent of the loss caused by the insurer's breach.4 '
Moreover, Zurich was chastised for attempting to whittle down its obligation
and pursuing that cause through the courts.4"
Finally, Justice Tobriner responded to the anticipated criticism that the
case makes everything subject to the duty to defend. He stated that the duty to
defend applies to all claims only if they fall within the scope of coverage.
4 3
Zurich, according to Justice Tobriner, "cannot construct a formal fortress of the
third party's pleadings and retreat behind its walls .... [Clourts do not examine
only the pleaded word but the potential liability created by the suit."'  Plead-
ings are "malleable, changeable and amendable."45 The allegedly injured third
party makes a poor arbiter of coverage.
Gray v. Zurich continues to make its presence known. In 1993, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Montrose Chemical Corp. of California v. Superior
Court had occasion to address the doctrine of reasonable expectations in the
context of massive CERCLA litigation.4 6 Montrose Chemical Corp. produced
DDT at a Southern California location from 1947 to 1982. The federal govern-
has a duty to defend, then any determination as to its duty to indemnify should be deferred until
the issue of [the insured's] liability is decided.
Id. at 967.
36 Steven, 377 P.2d at 173.
37 id.
38 Id. at 174.
39 Id.
40 Id.; see also Fischer, supra note 15, at 105.
41 Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 179 (Cal. 1966).
42 Id.
43 Id. at 176.
44 Id. The import of this language is discussed below; see infra text accompanying notes
57-60.
45 Id.
46 861 P.2d 1153, 1154-55 (Cal. 1993).
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ment ordered Montrose to participate in the cleanup of the now infamous
Stringfellow disposal site and the Los Angeles Harbor. Seven carriers who
wrote commercial general liability insurance coverage for Montrose over the
period refused or severely limited tender of defense for various reasons, among
them, that the dumpings were intentional acts.4 7 The court held that in pro-
ceedings for summary judgment: (1) both the insured and insurer could look to
facts outside the third party's complaint to determine the coverage question;
(2) the insured must make a prima facie showing of the potential for coverage;
and (3) the insurer must show as a matter of law that there is no coverage under
the policy.48 In reaching this result, the court relied on Gray v. Zurich, observ-
ing that California courts have been "consistently solicitous of the insureds'
expectations" in connection with insurance policy interpretation.49
Stepping back, one is forced to admire Justice Tobriner's audacity. He
begins with a conventional approach, he crafts a new doctrine that is apparently
applicable in a narrow context, and then he applies the new doctrine in a much
broader arena. Nearly thirty years after Gray v. Zurich, its principles find
application in a multi-billion dollar environmental case in which the doctrine of
reasonable expectations remains intact." This sweeping panorama should
leave even the casual observer of events with mouth agape.
IV. THE DuTY To DEFEND
As discussed above, a liability insurance policy imposes two primary obli-
gations on insurers. First, insurers have a duty to indemnify.51 Second, insur-
ers have a duty to defend.52 This dual aspect of a liability insurer's undertaking
can be confusing. It must be kept in mind that the duty to defend and the duty
to indemnify depend on the existence of coverage.53 While liability insurance
policies initially required insurers to indemnify without a corresponding duty to
47 Id. at 1155-56.
48 Id. at 1158-60. The insurer, however, is limited to reliance on undisputed or extrinsic
facts in making its showing so that the insured is not prejudiced by the prospect of having an
adverse finding in the declaratory relief action. Id.
'9 Id. at 1157; Harrington, supra note 12, at 182.
50 Professor Jeffrey W. Stempel argues that this should not be a remarkable occurrence. In
his view, jurists have been unnecessarily dissuaded from use of the doctrine of reasonable
expectations because of the undeserved emphasis on the "rights-at-variance" brand of the
doctrine. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectation: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable
Expectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L.J.
181, 182-84 (1998). California's experience appears to validate Professor Stempel's thesis
inasmuch as the doctrine has existed for more than forty-five years without much apparent
harm to the fabric of insurance law.
"' "[S]tandard comprehensive or commercial general liability insurance policies provide
that the insurer has a duty to indemnify the insured for those sums that the insured becomes
legally obligated to pay as damages for a covered claim." Aerojet Gen. Corp. v. Transp.
Indem. Co., 948 P.2d 909, 920 (Cal. 1997) (citing Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766
(Cal. 1997)).
52 "Standard comprehensive or commercial general liability insurance policies also provide
that the insurer has a duty to defend the insured in any action brought against the insured
seeking damages for a covered claim." Id. (citing Buss, 939 P.2d 766).
13 Susan Randall, supra note 24, at 251; Tom Baker, Liability Insurance Conflicts and
Defense Lawyers: From Triangles to Treahedrons, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 101, 138-39 (1997).
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defend, most policies also provided that insurers had a right to assume the con-
trol of a defense in order to protect its interests in litigation." This aspect
evolved into a duty to defend.5 5
Professor James Fischer states:
[C]ourts first defined the scope of the duty to defend in terms of the claim pleaded
against the insured in the underlying action. .... The claim alleged against the insured
by the claimant determined the insurer's obligation to defend, if any, because the
language of the complaint was compared with the language of the policy to deter-
mine if the claim was within the coverage provided the insured.56
This traditional reliance on the pleadings was a primary focus of Gray v.
Zurich. Gray held that a "[d]efendant cannot construct a formal fortress of the
third party's pleadings and retreat behind its walls. . . . [C]ourts do not
examine only the pleaded word but the potential liability created by the suit."57
The court's rationale was that, "[i]n light of the likely overstatement of the
complaint and of the plasticity of modem pleading, we should hardly designate
the third party as the arbiter of the policy's coverage. 5 8 Because, the court
found:
[R]estrict[ing] the defense obligation of the insurer to the precise language of the
pleading would not only ignore the thrust of the cases but would create an anomaly
for the insured .... [a]n insurer, therefore, bears a duty to defend its insured when-
ever it ascertains facts which give rise to the potential of liability under the policy.
59
Justice Tobriner was also careful to note that:
[M]odem procedural rules focus on the facts of a case rather than the theory of recov-
ery in the complaint, the duty to defend should be fixed by the facts which the insurer
learns from the complaint, the insured, or other sources. An insurer, therefore, bears
a duty to defend its insured whenever it ascertains facts, which give rise to the poten-
tial for liability under the policy.
6 0
It is clear Justice Tobriner saw Gray v. Zurich as harmonizing with mod-
em pleading and that his task was to mirror that aspect of the law. Seen as
such, the decision to abandon total reliance on the pleadings inevitably
followed.
Freeing the determination of the duty to defend from the confines of the
policy and the pleadings was extraordinary in itself. Combining this with the
application of the doctrine of reasonable expectations was powerful. 6 ' The
result was revolutionary.
Prior to Gray v. Zurich, California followed a more traditional approach.6 2
This approach, the so-called "four corners rule" (when applied to only the
pleading) or the "eight comers" rule (when applied to the pleading and to the
4 James M. Fischer, Broadening the Insurer's Duty to Defend: How Gray v. Zurich Insur-
ance Co. Transformed Liability Insurance into Litigation Insurance, 25 U.C. DAVIs L. REV.
141, 146-47 (1991).
55 Id. at 149.
56 Id. at 151.
57 Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 176 (Cal. 1966) (emphasis added).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 176-77.
61 Fischer, supra note 54, at 156-57.
62 In Ritchie v. Anchor, the court held that:
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insurance policy), essentially is a rule of formalism. It was similar to that cur-
rently favored in Texas in which the policy language is compared to the allega-
tions in the complaint in order to determine the scope of the duty to defend.
6 3
This approach has the advantage of intellectual convenience and is relatively
easy to apply.64
However, the approach in Gray v. Zurich appears to enjoy acceptance in
several states beyond California. Recent decisions in jurisdictions including
Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, and Wyoming, may be characterized by a broad
predisposition to find a duty to defend if there is any potential liability under
the policy.
65
Additionally, at least one case seems to signal that Gray v. Zurich's influ-
ence has extended to Illinois.66 Associated Indemnity Co. v. Insurance Co. of
North America acknowledged the insurer's obligation to defend if a complaint
stated claims covered by a policy, but pushed the boundary further by asserting
that, "the insurer is obligated to conduct the putative insured's defense if the
insurer has knowledge of true but unpleaded facts, which, when taken together
with the complaint's allegations, indicate that the claim is within or potentially
within a policy's coverage. '67 The Associated Indemnity court considered this
an issue not previously resolved in Illinois, but cited authority from other juris-
dictions as justification.6 8
Interestingly, Gray v. Zurich is not cited in Associated Indemnity, but Jus-
tice Tobriner's distinctive rhetoric is apparent. The Illinois court notes that,
"[t]o hold otherwise would allow the insurer to construct a formal fortress of
the third party's pleadings and to retreat behind its walls, thereby successfully
ignoring true but unpleaded facts within its knowledge that require it, under the
insurance policy, to conduct the putative insured's defense.",69 The opinion
goes on to discuss several issues covered by Gray v. Zurich including the rea-
the insurer's obligation to defend is measured by the terms of the insurance policy and the
pleading of the claimant who sues the insured .... [T]he complaint must be taken by its four
comers and the facts arrayed in a complete pattern without regard to niceties of pleading or
differentiation between different counts of a single complaint. And the ultimate question is
whether the facts alleged do fairly apprise the insurer that the plaintiff is suing the insured upon
an occurrence which, if his allegations are true, gives rise to liability of the insurer to insured
under the terms of the policy.
286 P.2d 1000, 1003-04 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955).
63 Am. Alliance Ins. Co. v. Frito Lay Inc., 788 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tex. App. 1990). Under
this approach, "[t]he duty to defend is not affected by facts ascertained before suit, devel-
oped in the process of litigation, or by the ultimate outcome of the suit." Id. at 154. One
commentator has suggested that this approach is the majority approach, and notes that other
states generally applying this standard (albeit by different names) include Florida, Illinois,
Minnesota, New York, Ohio, and Washington, among others. Rice, supra note 24, at 1152-
54.
4 Michael Sean Quinn & L. Kimberly Steele, Insurance Coverage Opinions, 36 S. TEX. L.
REV. 479 (1995) (discussing insurance coverage and the Texas approach).
65 Rice, supra note 24, at 1151.
6 Assoc. Indem. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 386 N.E.2d 529 (I11. App. Ct. 1979).
67 Id. at 536.
68 Id.
69 Id. (emphasized portions apparently quoting Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 176
(Cal. 1966)).
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sonable expectations doctrine, exclusionary clauses, and conflicts of interest.7 °
If not directly influenced by Gray v. Zurich, the decision certainly proceeded
along a parallel path.
Associated Indemnity notwithstanding, the generally accepted rule in Illi-
nois does not appear to have changed. A more recent decision, for example,
affirms that "the duty to defend extends only to suits and not to allegations,
accusations, or claims which have not been embodied within the context of a
complaint." 7 '
Associated Indemnity does not, however, appear to be completely without
influence. In 1991 in Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., the New
York Court of Appeals went beyond New York's general approach and
asserted "that the insurer must provide a defense if it has knowledge of facts
which potentially bring a claim within the policy's indemnity coverage. 7 1 Cit-
ing Associated Indemnity, the court goes on to use the same "formal fortress"
language originally used by Gray v. Zurich to explain why exclusive reference
to the third party's complaint might allow an insurer to avoid its responsibilities
under the contract.7 3 Like Associated Indemnity, Fitzpatrick does not cite Gray
v. Zurich, but it certainly appears to have been influenced by it from at least
three sources: directly from two California cases that rested on Gray; and
somewhat less directly via Associated Indemnity. 4
In California, Gray v. Zurich remains very much alive and plays a promi-
nent part in any number of significant cases.7 5 The principles in Gray v.
Zurich, however, have evolved to allow insurers to use evidence outside of the
complaint and the policy to demonstrate a lack of coverage. For example, the
California Supreme Court in Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court
found that "evidence extrinsic to the underlying complaint can defeat as well as
generate a defense duty." 7 6 However, in order to avoid the duty to defend the
court went on to emphasize that "the insurer must prove with undisputed extrin-
sic evidence that there is no possibility of coverage."7 7
Finally, Gray is an object lesson in jurisprudence. It is undeniable that
Gray v. Zurich has dramatically affected the structure of defense insurance and
litigation strategies within the tort system. The traditional eight corners rule is
70 Id. at 538-42.
71 Lapham-Hickey Steel Corp. v. Prot. Mut. Ins. Co., 655 N.E.2d 842, 847 (Il1. 1995).
72 Fitzpatrick v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 575 N.E.2d 90, 92 (N.Y. 1991).
73 Id. at 93-94.
74 Fresno Econ. Imp. Used Cars v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 142 Cal. Rptr. 681 (Ct. App.
1977); Mullen v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 140 Cal. Rptr. 605 (Ct. App. 1977). A brief analysis
reveals that Fitzpatrick has been followed in several instances by New York and other
courts. See Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Rapid-Am. Corp., 609 N.E.2d 506 (N.Y. 1993).
75 See, e.g., Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766, 773-75 (Cal. 1997); Montrose Chem.
Corp. of Cal. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153, 1157-64 (Cal. 1993); Bank of the W. v.
Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 551 (Cal. 1992).
76 Montrose, 861 P.2d at 1155.
In the same vein, Professor Susan Randall suggests that insurers should be permitted to
deny defense to insureds when extrinsic facts indicate no obligation of coverage. See Ran-
dall, supra note 24, at 224.
77 Michael A. Orlando & Megan Gabel, The Duty to Defend: What a Difference a State
Makes!., 29 Brief 14. Summer 2000. at 16.
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simply not up to the task in today's world.78 New York's Fitzpatrick case
emphasizes how much Gray v. Zurich was ahead of its time forty-five years
ago.
V. CONCLUSION
Gray v. Zurich is a classic insurance law opinion, which is destined to
survive as a classroom chestnut and as a foundation of modem insurance law.
First, as a teaching tool, Gray v. Zurich is unparalleled. It has the unique com-
bination of simple facts and bedrock principles laid out with incomparable rhe-
torical flourish. Indeed, the failure of one court to cite Gray v. Zurich is glaring
due to the unattributed use of Justice Tobriner' s colorful metaphor admonishing
us not to make a fortress of pleadings.79
Second, Gray v. Zurich is a foundation of modem insurance law. It breaks
new ground in three significant areas: the intentional acts exclusion, the doc-
trine of reasonable expectations, and the duty to defend. While each of these
areas was the subject of separate evolutions, the confluence of these principles
with extensions of each in a single case was unprecedented. This combination
of facts and the judicial art is rare.
It is fashionable to decry "judicial activism," and politicians are quick to
voice their support for judges who will uphold the law as written. 80 Happily,
those who are discerning know that legislatures express themselves imper-
fectly, that the judiciary is a separate branch of government with its own set of
responsibilities, and that able judges must exercise considerable discretion on a
daily basis within the context of existing norms.81 How fortunate then that
California had a person of Justice Tobriner's ability to guide it through the
intricacies of insurance law. As a teacher of insurance law, I am amazed by the
eloquence of Gray v. Zurich every time I teach a new class of students. If I can
open my students' eyes to the shining jewel of Gray v. Zurich, I count the class
a success.
78 Randall, supra note 24, at 265 (noting the lack of justification for the complaint rule and
urging modification).
Professor James M. Fischer argues that the potentiality test adopted in Gray v. Zurich is
based on public policy considerations that the duty to defend is broader than the duty to
indemnify. See Fischer, supra note 54. He concludes that the accommodation of Gray is
justified because it forces insurers ultimately to internalize the costs of the duty to defend.
Id. at 182.
79 Assoc. Indem. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 386 N.E.2d 529, 536 (I11. App. Ct. 1979).
80 GRODIN, supra note 1, at 133 (criticizing a former U.S. Attorney General's comment that
judges should not make law).
81 Id.; ROBERT E. KEETON, JUDGING 28-30 (1990).
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